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Secession in International Law and Relations:  
What Are We Talking About? 
GLEN ANDERSON 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cold War scholars have devoted increasing 
attention to the process of state creation known as “secession.” Exactly 
what the concept of secession entails, however, is still very much a 
moot point. The concept remains undefined by treaty law and United 
Nations (UN) declaratory General Assembly resolutions. Indeed the 
word “secession” is conspicuously absent from virtually all 
international legal instruments.1 This situation is explicable by the fact 
that secession represents a challenge to perhaps the two most 
fundamental principles of international law: the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states. Secession is thus viewed negatively and is 
 
 Dr. Glen Anderson is a Lecturer in law at Newcastle University Australia and has previously 
been employed at the School of Law Macquarie University Australia. He has also published on 
unilateral non-colonial secession in the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy and the 
Connecticut Journal of International Law. 
 1. With the exception of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and 
Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Vol. X), at 80 (Dec. 9 1981)), which in Article 2(II)(f) proclaims “[t]he duty 
of . . . State[s] to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of 
rebellious or secessionist activities within other States under any pretext whatsoever, or any 
action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of other 
States.” Of course secession in a non-colonial context is widely believed to be implicitly 
mentioned within Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter 
of the United Nations (G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A (Oct. 24 1970)), which provides 
that “[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed 
of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to 
race creed or colour.” The same text is repeated, mutatis mutandis, in Article 1 of the Declaration 
on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. GAOR, 
50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/6, at 1 (Oct. 24, 1995)). If it is accepted that the word 
“secession” also encompasses decolonization—as this article propounds infra−then other 
instruments might also be considered as implicitly touching upon colonial secession, principal 
among which is the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples. See G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/15 (Dec. 14, 1960). 
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associated with chaos, schism, fragmentation, and instability.2 So strong 
is the sentiment against secession that former UN Secretary-General, U 
Thant, contended in 1970 that the international organization “has never 
accepted and does not accept and I do not believe will ever accept the 
principle of secession of part of its Member State[s].”3 
With the lack of a legal definition of secession, various scholars 
have attempted to define the concept. Some scholars, it would seem, are 
determined to minimize the scope of secession, circumscribing their 
definitions to only the most exacting circumstances.4 Others adopt broad 
definitions that encompass a wide range of circumstances.5 In any event, 
virtually all scholarly definitions fail to enumerate any reasoning to 
justify their inclusion or exclusion of certain definitional elements.6  
The present article aims to address this deficiency by examining 
the etymological and conceptual bases of secession. Significantly, it 
also combines this examination with recourse to international law. The 
article thus produces a definition of secession that is informed 
etymologically, conceptually and legally. It is submitted that this mixed 
approach is desirable for two reasons: first, secession is, prima facie, a 
concept of generic application and meaning, and thus, any definition of 
secession in any specific context must account for etymological and 
conceptual foundations; and second, given that the present article is 
focused specifically on secession in the context of international law and 
relations, any comprehensive definition relating thereto must account 
for relevant international legal principles.  
II.  DEFINITION OF SECESSION 
On the basis of the forthcoming analysis, the present article defines 
secession in the context of international law and relations as: The 
withdrawal of territory (colonial or non-colonial) from part of an 
existing state to create a new state.  
 
 2. Bertus de Villiers, Secession – The Last Resort for Minority Protection, J. OF ASIAN & 
AFR. STUDIES 1 (2012).   
 3. Secretary-General’s Press Conferences, 7 UN Monthly Chron. 35, 36 (1970). 
 4. Here the definitions provided by Heraclides and Crawford are apposite. See generally 
ALEXIS HERACLIDES, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1 
(1991); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 375 (2d 
ed. 2006) [hereinafter CRAWFORD]. 
 5. Here the definitions Buchanan and Raič are apposite. See Allen Buchanan, “Secession,” 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Feb. 24, 2013), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/secession; DAVID RAIČ, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 308 (2002). 
 6. Radan’s work is a notable exception. See Aleksandar Pavković & Peter Radan, 
Secession: A Word in Search of a Meaning, in ON THE WAY TO STATEHOOD: SECESSION AND 
GLOBALISATION 17–32 (Aleksandar Pavković & Peter Radan eds., 2008); Aleksandar Pavković 
& Peter Radan, CREATING NEW STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SECESSION 5–30 (2007).  
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The foregoing definition includes and excludes a number of 
distinct elements, some of which may not be immediately obvious. 
First, it suggests, in a conceptual sense, that secession is synonymous 
with withdrawal; second, it captures consensual and unilateral 
secession; third, it excludes irredentism, which does not involve the 
creation of a new state, but rather the amalgamation of an existing 
state’s territory, in whole or part, with another existing state; fourth, it 
includes the independence of colonial territories. The reasoning that 
informs these various definitional elements is enumerated below. 
III.  ETYMOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BASES OF SECESSION 
The etymology of “secession” lies in the Latin terms “se” meaning 
“apart” and “cedere” meaning “to go.”7 This indicates that secession is 
synonymous with moving apart or withdrawing. This meaning is 
mirrored by the Oxford English Dictionary which defines “secession” as 
“[t]he action of seceding or formally withdrawing from an alliance, a 
federation, a political or religious organization, or the like.”8 In an 
abstract sense, secession is thus synonymous with withdrawal. 
At this initial point it is apposite to consider whether the concept of 
secession requires—from the perspective of the object undergoing 
secession—endogenous or exogenous motivation. At first blush it might 
seem that the definitions of secession cited above only require a 
withdrawal, not an endogenously or exogenously motivated withdrawal. 
To investigate this question further, it is useful to briefly consider the 
definition of the related terms “annexation” and “cession.”  
The etymology of “annexation” lies in the Latin term “annecetere” 
which means “to bind to.”9 The Oxford English Dictionary similarly 
defines “annex” as the “join[ing] in a subordinate capacity” and 
 
 7. Definition of Secession, ONLINE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=secession&searchmode=term (last visited Feb. 18, 
2013); see also Radan, supra note 6, at 18; Craven suggests that the Latin antecedent is 
“secessionem.” See Greg Craven, ‘Of Federalism, Secession, Canada and Quebec’ (1991-1992) 
14 THE DALHOUSIE L. J. 231, 232 (1991–1992); GREGORY CRAVEN, SECESSION: THE ULTIMATE 
STATES RIGHT 3 (1986). 
 8. 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 348 (Clarendon Press, 1933). Other English language 
dictionaries also define secession as synonymous with withdrawal. The Macquarie Dictionary 
describes “secession” as “the act of seceding.” The same dictionary defines the term “seceding” 
as “withdraw[ing] formally from an alliance or association, as from a political or religious 
organization.” (Macquarie Dictionary 1277 (Macquarie, 4th ed. 2005)); The Collins English 
Dictionary suggests that “secession” connotes “the act of seceding” with the same dictionary 
defining the term “seceding” as “formal withdrawal of membership, as from a political alliance, 
church, organization etc.” (Collins English Dictionary 1389 (Harper Collins, 4th ed. 1998)); see 
also MILICA ZARKOVIC BOOKMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF SECESSION 3 (St Martin’s Press, 1993). 
 9. Definition of Annex, ONLINE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=annex&searchmode=none. 
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“annexation” as the “attaching . . . [of a] possession, or territorial 
dependency.”10 These definitions indicate that from the perspective of 
the object being annexed, the incorporation is exogenous. This prompts 
the question: are the concepts of secession and annexation synonymous? 
The answer must be in the negative, as the two words are not used 
interchangeably, thereby indicating that “secession” connotes 
endogenous motivation.  
This finding is reinforced by examination of the term “cession,” 
the etymology of which lies in the Latin phrase “cedere” which means 
“go away.”11 The Oxford English Dictionary concomitantly defines 
“cession” as the “ceding” or “giving up” of an object.12 These 
definitions indicate that an object that is ceded is under the control of an 
exogenous force. The question must therefore be asked: are the concepts 
of secession and cession synonymous? Given that the two words are not 
used interchangeably, it would seem the answer is “no,” thus again 
indicating that secession connotes endogenous motivation.  
Bearing these conceptual points in mind, it is necessary to consider 
the definition of secession specifically in the context of international 
law and relations. In order to advance the definition of secession within 
this context, it must first be ascertained within this particular context 
what the term describes the secession of. An initial answer might be that 
secession refers to the withdrawal of territory from part of an existing 
state to create a new state. Whilst this answer is generally descriptive of 
the factual events associated with secession, it does not fully describe 
the legal processes that inform these factual events. A more detailed 
answer is that secession refers to the withdrawal of territory and 
sovereignty from part of an existing state to create a new state. Thus, it 
is not only the loss of territory which is central, but also the legal title, 
or sovereignty, asserted over this territory.13 This generates the 
inevitable and controversial question: what is sovereignty? 
The concept of “sovereignty” is notoriously vexing to define.14 A 
 
 10. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 339 (Clarendon Press, 1933).  
 11. Definition of Cession, ONLINE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=cession&searchmode=none; Quoted in “Cede,” 
ONLINE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=cede&searchmode=none. 
 12. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 239 (Clarendon Press, 1933).   
 13. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 
(Routledge, 7th ed. 1997).  
 14. The etymological basis of the word “sovereignty” lies in the Latin term “superanus” 
meaning “chief” or “principal.” Quoted in Sovereignty” ONLINE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY, 
http:/www/etymonline.com/index.php?search=sovereign&searchmode=none (last visited March 
21, 2013); see also ESA PAASIVIRTA, Internationalization and Stabilization of Contracts Versus 
State Sovereignty, 60 BRIT. Y.B. OF INTL. L., Vol. 60 331 (1989); THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Francis Kofi Abiew ed., 1999); 
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useful starting point, however, is provided by the Corfu Channel Case 
(UK v Albania),15 where Alvarez J noted that “[b]y sovereignty, we 
understand the whole body of rules and attributes which the state 
possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other states . . . .”16 A 
priori, only states may possess and exercise sovereignty.17 The 
definition also emphasizes the internal or domestic nature of 
sovereignty, suggesting a state’s ability to legislate rules and procedures 
throughout its territory without external interference.  
Crawford has provided a more recent and detailed definition of 
sovereignty:  
In its most common modern usage, sovereignty is the term for ‘the 
totality of international rights and duties recognized by international 
law’ as residing in an independent territorial unit—the State. It is 
not itself a right, nor is it a criterion for statehood (sovereignty is an 
attribute of States, not a precondition). It is a somewhat unhelpful 
but firmly established, description of statehood; a brief term for the 
State’s attribute of more-or-less plenary competence.
18
 
Crawford’s definition suggests that sovereignty is not a criterion of 
statehood, but rather a descriptor thereof, and thus the withdrawal of 
territory from part of an existing state to create a new state is, in effect, 
a partial withdrawal of sovereignty. Once sovereignty over a given 
territory has been withdrawn by the process of secession, the newly 
created state then enjoys “more-or-less plenary legislative competence” 
throughout its territory.19  
 
RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY: FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICT (1996); Robert 
Trisotto, Seceding in the Twenty-First Century: A Paradigm for the Ages, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 
422–25 (2010); For a particularly extensive discussion of the etymology of the term 
“sovereignty” see GERARD KREIJEN, STATE FAILURE, SOVEREIGNTY AND EFFECTIVENESS: 
LEGAL LESSONS FROM THE DECOLONIZATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 27–28 (2004). 
 15. Corfu Channel (U.K. and N. Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9, 1949). 
 16. Id. 
 17. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 15 (1990); ABIEW, supra note 14, at 25. 
 18. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 32. 
 19. Id. Other scholars have espoused similar definitions of sovereignty: MARTIN DIXON, 
TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (7th ed. 2013); Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: 
Juridical Underpinnings 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 375 (2003); ABIEW, supra note 14. 
at 24–25; Samuel M Makinda, Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United 
Nations, 2 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 149, 150 (1996); CATHERINE J IORNS, Indigenous Peoples and 
Self-Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 199, 236 (1992); 
Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law Context 26 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 417, 419–20 (2000–2001); see also STEPHEN D KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED 
HYPOCRISY 20–21 (1999); ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY: EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA, 10–11 
(2007); LUZIUS WILDHABER, Sovereignty and International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND 
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THEORY 
427–52 (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnson eds., 1983); ALAN JAMES, 
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Importantly, Crawford’s definition does not equate the attribute of 
sovereignty with absolute plenary legislative competence. This is 
because sovereignty has traditionally been conceived as subject to the 
overarching limits imposed by international law.20 This requirement 
flows principally from the widely accepted premise that all states enjoy 
equal sovereignty.21 In order for this proposition to possess any 
meaningful significance, it follows that states must be free to exercise 
plenary legislative competence only within their respective sovereign 
territory.  
In more recent times, sovereignty has undergone even more 
substantial qualifications, particularly with the general acceptance of 
peremptory norms (jus cogens).22 These norms, integrated into Article 
53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in cases such as 
Nicaragua v the United States of America,23 Case Concerning Oil 
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v the United States of America)24 
and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion)25 are non-derogable, requiring 
 
SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 1 (Paul Wilkinson ed., 1986); 
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48–53 (Oxford University Press, 2d ed., 2005); 
JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE INTERPLAY OF 
THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-COLONIAL 
‘NATIONAL’ IDENTITY 75–108 (2000); HANNUM, supra note 17, at 14–23; The realist scholar, 
Morgenthau, describes sovereignty as “supreme power over a certain territory.” HANS 
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 13 (1973). 
 20. The term “independence” has been defined by Anzilotti J as “no more than the normal 
condition of States according to international law; it may also be described as sovereignty 
(suprema potestas), or external sovereignty, by which is meant that the State has over it no higher 
authority than that of international law.” Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria (Ger. v. 
Austria), Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) Nos. 41, 45, 57 (Mar. 19) (Individual 
Opinion of Judge Anzilotti); see also Karima Bennoune, Sovereignty vs. Suffering? Re-
Examining Sovereignty and Human Rights through the Lens of Iraq, EUR. J. INT’L. L., 245–46 
(2002). 
 21. In this regard see U.N. Charter arts. 2(1) and 2(7). See generally MICHAEL R FOWLER 
AND JULIE M BUNCK, LAW, POWER AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE 47 (1995) on the subject of 
sovereign equality; EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 114–15, 120 (1972). 
 22. Jus cogens refers to “compelling law” and can be contrasted with jus dispositivum, 
which refers to law “subject to the dispensation of the parties.” See ALEXANDER 
ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (2006); CRAWFORD, 
supra note 4, at 99–100; RAIČ, supra note 5, at 142. 
 23. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 100–01 (June 27).  
 24. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 330, 919 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion on Judge 
Simma); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 260, 9146 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion on Judge 
Kooijmans); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 291, part 1.1 (Nov. 6) (dissenting opinion on 
Judge Elaraby). 
 25. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 122, 3.1 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Elaraby). 
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observance from states even in the context of their domestic legislation. 
Sovereignty is therefore not an absolutist concept. 
The “qualified” approach to sovereignty, with its emphasis on 
respect for international law and compliance with peremptory norms, is 
thus the present article’s preferred interpretation.26 It follows then that 
whenever sovereignty—as described above—is withdrawn from 
territory forming part of an existing state to create a new state, secession 
will have occurred.  
IV.  SECESSION IS A PROCESS AND AN OUTCOME 
Another important conceptual issue relating to secession is that it 
is a process which leads to an outcome.27 Kohen, for example, has 
correctly observed that "[s]ecession is not an instant fact. It always 
implies a complex series of claims and decisions, negotiations and/or 
struggle, which may – or may not – lead to the creation of a new 
State."28 
Crucially, the process by which withdrawal is achieved need not 
have any impact upon the eventual outcome. This can be demonstrated 
by way of a simple analogy. A car, for example, can be built precisely 
to plan by a robotic or human assembly line. Although both cars are the 
result of different production processes, the outcome is identical: a new 
car.  
The conflation of process and outcome outlined above, however, is 
endemic throughout scholarly discussions of secession. Crawford has 
defined secession as “the creation of a State by the use or threat of force 
without the consent of the former sovereign."29 Secession can thus only 
occur when the use or threat of force is employed without the existing 
 
 26. This approach is supported by various scholars: Dan Philpotti, Sovereignty, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/ (last updated 
June 8, 2010); JEAN BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE, LIVRE 1, CH. 6, 131 (1576); 
Oscar Schachter, Sovereignty – Then and Now, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WANG TIEYA 671 
(Ronald St. John MacDonald ed., 1994); IVAN A SHEARER, STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(11th ed., 1994); HANNUM, supra note 17, at 19; Clarence Jenks, The Thesis and Its Critics, in 
SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW II (Arthur Larson et al. eds., 1695); Manfred Lachs, The 
Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Times, 169 RECUIL DES COURS 
29–41 (1980–IV); Georg Nolte, Secession and External Intervention, in SECESSION: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 65, 70 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2006); Helmut Steinburger, 
Sovereignty, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. 518 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000); JAN H.W. 
VERZUL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 265 (1968); IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 2008). 
 27. Pavković & Radan, supra note 6, at 7. 
 28. MARCELO G KOHEN, SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 14 (2006); see 
also Bruno Coppieters, Introduction, in CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION: NORMATIVE STUDIES IN 
A COMP. PERSP. 4–5 (Bruno Coppieters and Richard Sakwa eds., 2003). 
 29. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 375 (emphasis added). 
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state’s consent. Heraclides has similarly conditioned the outcome of 
secession on the specific process by which it is achieved: “Secession is 
a special kind of territorial separatism involving states. It is an abrupt 
unilateral move to independence on the part of the region that is a 
metropolitan territory of a sovereign independent state.”30 Remarkably, 
Kohen, who has specifically alluded to secession as both a process and 
an outcome, has also defined the term in relation to a specific process, 
namely, “the creation of a new independent entity through the 
separation of part of the territory . . . of an existing State, without the 
consent of the latter.”31 Other scholars have devised similarly restrictive 
definitions.32 Yet nowhere in the Latin antecedents for the term 
“secession” and the dictionary definitions hitherto reviewed is the 
outcome of secession made contingent on the specific process of 
withdrawal. This indicates that attempts to narrow the definition of 
secession in the international law and relations context cannot be 
conceptually justified.   
Once it is accepted that the specific process of withdrawal is 
separate from the outcome, it emerges that there are two basic secession 
types: consensual and unilateral. The former can be divided into two 
further secession types: constitutional and politically negotiated. These 
three secession processes are discussed below.  
Constitutional secession occurs with the existing state’s consent, 
and does not involve the use or threat of force. This secession type can 
be divided into two sub-categories: negotiated and explicit. The former 
occurs within the framework of the existing state’s constitution, even 
though there are no specific constitutional provisions relating to 
secession.33 Typically, a constitutional amendment is negotiated, which 
allows for the lawful secession of part of the existing state’s territory. In 
Reference re Secession of Quebec,34 for example, the Canadian 
Supreme Court indicated that in the future, Quebec or any other 
 
 30. HERACLIDES, supra note 4, at 1 (emphasis added).  
 31. KOHEN, supra note 28, at 3 (emphasis added).  
 32. John Dugard, A Legal Basis for Secession – Relevant Principles and Rules, in 
SECESSION AND INT’L L.: CONFLICT AVOIDANCE – REGIONAL APPRAISALS 89, 89 (Julie Dahlitz, 
ed. 2003); JO ERIC MURKENS, SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 9 (Jo Eric 
Mukens et al. eds., 2002); Frida A. Pfirter and Silvina G. Napolitano, Secession and International 
Law: Latin American Practice, in SECESSION, INT’L L. PERSPECTIVES 375 (Marcelo G. Kohen 
ed., 2006); LINDA S. BISHAI, FORGETTING OURSELVES, SECESSION AND THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF 
TERRITORIAL IDENTITY 33 (2004); GNANAPALA WELHENGAMA, MINORITIES’ CLAIMS: FROM 
AUTONOMY TO SECESSION, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE PRACTICE 214 (2000); Yuchao 
Zhu and Dongyan Blachford, Ethnic Dispute in International Politics: Manifestation and 
Conceptualizations 12 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS 25, 46 (2006). 
 33. Andrei Kreptul, The Constitutional Right of Secession in Political Theory and History 
17(4) 39, 77 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD.   
 34. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
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Canadian province may be able to secede constitutionally from Canada, 
provided a constitutional amendment effecting secession was 
negotiated.35 In 2000, the Canadian federal parliament passed the 
Clarity Act, which reaffirmed the constitutional process prescribed by 
the Court: a clear referendum vote in favour of secession,36 followed by 
negotiated agreement between Quebec and the rest of Canada,37  and 
finally the passage of a constitutional amendment lawfully effecting 
Quebec’s secession.38 Scholars such as Radan and Amar have deduced a 
similar right from the Constitution of the United States (US),39 
notwithstanding the judgment of the US Supreme Court in Texas v 
White,40 which has been traditionally regarded as precluding a 
constitutional right to secession.41  
Explicit constitutional secession occurs when the existing state’s 
constitution prescribes a specific procedure for the secession of part of 
its territory, usually federal or provincial units. The 1921 Liechtenstein 
Constitution,42 1931 Chinese Constitution,43 1947 Constitution of the 
Union of Burma,44 1968 Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist 
 
 35. See Peter Radan, Constitutional Law and Secession: The Case of Quebec, 2 
MACARTHUR L. REV. 69–85 (1998); see generally Peter Radan, “You Can’t Always Get What 
You Want”: The Territorial Scope of An Independent Quebec 41 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 629, 633 
(2003); Pierre Bienvenu, Secession by Constitutional Means: Decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference 21 HAMLINE J. OF PUB. L. AND POL’Y 1, 1–65 
(1999); Marc Arthur Thibodeau, The Legality of an Independent Quebec: Canadian 
Constitutional Law and Self-Determination in International Law, 3 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
99, 99–142 (1979–80); Rosemary Rayfuse, Reference re Secession of Quebec from Canada: 
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, 21 UNSW L. J. 834, 839–41 (1998); Johan D van der Vyver, Self-
Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under International Law, 10 FLA. ST. J. OF TRANSNAT’L 
L. & POL’Y 8–11 (2000); Kevin MacMillan, Secession Perspectives and the Independence of 
Quebec, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 333, 353–59 (1999); Jean Raby, Quebec: Trendsetter for a 
Depolarized World?, 33 HARV. INT’L L. J. 441–58 (1992). 
 36. Clarity Act, S.C. 2000, c. 26, art. 1 (Can.); Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra 
note 34, at 87.  
 37. Clarity Act, supra note 36, art. 2; Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 34, at 
87–88. 
 38. Clarity Act, supra note 36, art. 3; Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 34, at 
94–97. In the aforementioned paragraphs, the Court noted, however, that an amendment to the 
Constitution of Canada may be difficult, if not impossible to achieve. 
 39. Peter Radan, An Indestructible Union…of Indestructible States: The Supreme Court of 
the United States and Secession, 10 LEGAL HISTORY 187, 195 (2006); Akhil Reed Amar, The 
David C Baum Lecture: Abraham Lincoln and the American Union, U. ILL. L. REV. 1109, 1115 
(2001). 
 40. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 726 (1869). 
 41. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 CHI. L. REV. 633  (1991). 
 42. LIECHTENSTEIN CONSTITUTION 1921, art. 4(2).    
 43. XIANFA art. 4 (1975) (China). This right was expressly expunged by Article 4 of the 
1975 Chinese Constitution. 
 44. CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF BURMA 1947, ch. 10. 
The right was expunged by the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of 
Burma. See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 99–100 
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Republic,45 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia,46 and 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union,47 for instance, 
all alluded to the concept of secession (even if in an incomplete, vague 
or only theoretical manner) for constituent national groups. More 
recently, the 1984 Saint Christopher and Nevis Constitution,48 1994 
Ethiopian Constitution49 and 2003 Constitutional Charter of the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro50 prescribed a specific procedure for 
secession under certain circumstances.  
Politically negotiated secession occurs with the existing state’s 
consent and does not necessarily involve the use or threat of force. It 
requires that the existing state and the secessionist entity be willing to 
politically negotiate the resolution of a secessionist situation. It is most 
likely to occur when the existing state fails to provide any constitutional 
avenue for secession for constituent national groups and when relations 
between the existing sovereign and secessionist entity are amicable.51 
Numerous historical examples of politically negotiated secession exist. 
In June 1905, Norway seceded from the Union of Sweden and Norway 
after a plebiscite for independence was endorsed by ninety-nine percent 
of Norwegians.52 In December 1918, following the “Act of Union,” 
 
(1978); see Josef Silverstein, Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession from the 
Union of Burma, 18 J. ASIAN STUD. 43–49 (1958); JORRI DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-STATES 90 (1996). 
 45. 1968 CONSTITUTION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, Preamble; see 
RAIČ, supra note 5, at 313–14. 
 46. 1974 SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONSTITUTION, Preamble. 
 47. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977), art. 72 [KONST. SSSR][USSR CONSTITUTION] [hereinafter 
USSR CONSTITUTION]. 
 48. ST. CHRISTOPHER & NEVIS CONST., art. 113, §1 & 2 (1984); MIODRAG JOVANOVIĆ, 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING SECESSION IN FEDERALIZED STATES: A PROCEDURAL APPROACH, 138–
39 (2007); Simeon C. R. McIntosh, The St. Kitts-Nevis Question: Secession or Constitutional 
Reform?, 7 CARIBBEAN L. REV. 419–63 (1997).   
 49. 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia, art. 60 § 1, 4, 5; Alem Habtu, Multiethnic Federalism in 
Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution 35(2) PUBLIUS 313, 313–35 (2005); 
Ugo A Mattei, The New Ethiopian Constitution: First Thoughts on Ethnical Federalism and the 
Reception of Western Institutions, CARDOZO ELECTRONIC L. BULLETIN, available at 
http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Constitutional/Mattei2.html; Alem Habtu, Ethnic 
Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the Ethiopian Federation, 28 DIALECTICAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 91–123 (2004); Minasse Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact 
upon Unity, Human Rights and Development, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 33 (1996). 
 50. See Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 49; Art. 60 of the now defunct 2003 
Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro §§ 1–5; see Miodrag 
Jovanović, Consensual Secession of Montenegro – Towards Good Practice?, in ON THE WAY TO 
STATEHOOD: SECESSION AND GLOBALIZATION 138 (Aleksandar Pavković & Peter Radan eds., 
2008); see JOVANOVIĆ, supra note 48, at  126–28. 
 51. See generally Robert A Young, How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen? CAN. J. OF POL. 
SCI. 773, 773–92 (1994). 
 52. Id. at 781–83; KAREN LARSEN, A HISTORY OF NORWAY 484–95 (1948); MARGARET 
STEWART OMRčANIN, NORWAY, SWEDEN CROATIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STATE 
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Iceland seceded from Denmark and assumed the status of an 
independent state, although still remaining under the personal union of 
the Danish Monarchy.53 In 1922, Southern Ireland gained its 
independence from the United Kingdom after an act of British 
parliament relinquished the territory.54 In August 1960, the Senegal 
government seceded from the Mali Federation, arguing that the 
federation was comprised of sovereign states, all of which retained an 
inherent right to withdraw.55 In November 1961, Syria withdrew from 
the United Arab Republic.56 In August 1965, Singapore seceded from 
the Malaysian Federation with the latter’s legislature passing a bill to 
effect separation.57 In September 1991, after a period of considerable 
political confusion, the Soviet Government recognized the sovereign 
independence of former union republics: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
which opened the way for other union republics, such as Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to also negotiate their 
secession from the USSR.58 In January 1993, Czechoslovakia was 
peacefully dissolved by the respective secessions of the Czech Republic 
and the Slovak Republic.59 
Unilateral secession occurs without the existing state’s consent 
and may also involve the use or threat of force.60 It usually occurs in the 
absence of relevant constitutional provisions and political negotiation. 
 
SECESSION AND FORMATION 9–11 (1976); JANE JACOBS, THE QUEST OF SEPARATISM: QUEBEC 
AND THE STRUGGLE OVER SOVEREIGNTY 26–51 (1981). 
 53. RICHARD F. TOMASSON, ICELAND: THE FIRST NEW SOCIETY 21 (1980); GUNNAR 
KARLSSON,. THE HISTORY OF ICELAND 280–84 (2000). 
 54. Bill Kissane, The Doctrine of Self-Determination and the Irish Move to Independence, 
1916-1922, 8 J. OF POL. IDEOLOGIES 327 (2002); see Stephane Dion, Why is Secession Difficult 
in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec, 26(2) BRIT. J. OF POL. SC. 269, 270 
(1996). 
 55. Buchheit, supra note 44, at 99; Rosalyn Cohen, Legal Problems Arising from the 
Dissolution of the Mali Federation, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 376 (1960); WILLIAM F. FOLTZ, 
FROM FRENCH WEST AFRICA TO THE MALI FEDERATION (1965); SHELDON GELLAR, SENEGAL: 
AFRICAN NATION BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE WEST 20–21 (1982). 
 56. Buchheit, supra note 44, at 99. 
 57. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 314–15. 
 58. See CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 395; Regarding the independence of the Baltic 
republics, see also Rein Müllerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the 
Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 42(3) INT’L AND COMP. L.Q. 473, 480–81. (1993) (regarding the 
independence of the Baltic republics). 
 59. Jiri Malenovsky, Problèmes juridiques liés à la Partition de la Tchécoslovaquie, y 
Compris Tracé de la Frontier, 39 ANNUARIE  FRANCAIS DE DROIT INT’L 305 (1993); Jon Elster, 
Transition, Constitution-Making and Separation in Czechoslovakia, 36 EUR. J. SOC. 105–34 
(1995); ABBY INNES, CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE SHORT GOODBYE 176–219 (2001); Pavković & 
Radan, supra note 6, at 73–78. 
 60. According to the definition of secession provided by Crawford, unilateral secession and 
the use or threat of force are concomitant. See CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 375. 
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However unilateral secession can occur despite the existence of 
constitutional provisions (which are either deemed inadequate by the 
secessionist entity or ignored), and can be preceded by initial attempts 
at political negotiation, which ultimately fail.  
When unilateral secession occurs, the existing state’s claim to 
sovereignty over the seceding territory conflicts with that of the 
(putative) secessionist state. This impasse attracts the supervening 
jurisdiction of international law, which then purports to employ legal 
principles to resolve the dispute. Foremost among such principles is the 
international law of self-determination, as developed and applied by UN 
instruments such as the UN Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,61 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,62 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights63 the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations,64 
and Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
United Nations.65 
Examples of successful unilateral colonial secessions66 include 
Indonesia (the Netherlands), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(France), Algeria (France) and Guinea-Bissau (Portugal).67 The 
independence of Bangladesh (Pakistan), Eritrea (Ethiopia), Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia and 
Kosovo (Yugoslavia) and South Sudan (Sudan) are arguably instances 
of successful unilateral non-colonial (UNC) secessions.68 Other attempts 
at UNC secession, such as Tibet (China), Katanga (Congo), Biafra 
(Nigeria), Kashmir (India), the Karen and Shan States (Burma), the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Cyprus), Tamil Elam (Sri 
 
 61. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/1541 (Dec. 14, 1960).  
 62. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966) (The Economic Rights 
Covenant entered into force as a treaty on 3 January 1976). 
 63. Id. (The Civil Rights Covenant entered into force as a treaty on 23 March 1976.). 
 64. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 65. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/3314 (Oct. 24, 1995).  
 66. For why decolonization constitutes secession, see the present article infra. 
 67. See CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 384–88. 
 68. See CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 391. South Sudan might alternatively be considered a 
consensual secession, given that it was ultimately achieved by way of a referendum. See Anthony 
J. Christopher, Secession and South Sudan: an African Precedent for the Future?, 93 S. AFR. 
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 125, 125–32 (2011) (explaining that an agreement regarding a constitutional 
means of attaining secession was effective); see Peter Radan, Secessionist Referenda in 
International and Domestic Law, 18 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLS. 8–21 (2012). It should be 
noted, however, that this vote was the ultimate culmination of “the longest civil conflict on the 
continent [of Africa].” Khalid Medani, Strife and Secession in Sudan, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 135, 
135 (2011). The secession of South Sudan might therefore be classified as unilateral in substance. 
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Lanka), Kurdistan (Iraq/Turkey), Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), 
Serbian Krajina (Croatia), Anjounan (the Islamic Republic of 
Comoros), Nagorny-Kharabakh (Azerbaijan), Somaliland (Somalia), 
Chechnya (Russian Federation), Gagauzia (Moldova), Transnistria 
(Moldova), Abkhazia (Georgia)69 and South Ossetia (Georgia),70 have 
been unsuccessful.71 
V.  WHEN DOES THE PROCESS OF SECESSION CONCLUDE  
AND THE OUTCOME BEGIN? 
Once it is accepted that secession is a process that leads to an 
outcome, it must be determined how the process is distinguishable from 
the outcome. The short answer is that the process ends and the outcome 
begins when the seceding territory completes the transformation to a 
new state. Yet trying to determine precisely when this transformation 
occurs is a complex (and controversial) issue. This is mainly due to the 
ongoing conflict between the declaratory, constitutive and constitutive-
collective recognition theories. The declaratory recognition theory, 
propounded by scholars such as Chen, Brierly, Crawford, Raič and 
Cassese maintains that recognition is not a sine qua non for statehood.72 
The constitutive recognition theory, advocated by scholars such as 
Oppenheim, Lauterpacht and Roth postulates that recognition is a sine 
qua non for statehood.73 The constitutive-collective recognition theory, 
argued by scholars such as Kelsen and Dugard similarly suggests that 
 
 69. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 403; Abkhazia may eventually become a successful UNC 
secession, given that the Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu and Tuvalu 
have extended recognition on the 26 August 2008, 5 September 2008, 10 September 2009, 15 
December 2009, 15 December 2009, 23 May 2011 and 18 September 2011 respectively. But see 
Jelena Radoman, Future Kosovo Status – Precedent or Universal Solution, 3 W. BALKANS SEC. 
OBSERVER 14 (2006) for discussion of the Abkhazia conflict in general; see also CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE, CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN GEORGIA: A SYNTHESIS ANALYSIS WITH 
A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 1–58 (Antje Herrberg ed., 2006) for discussion of the Abkhazia conflict in 
general. 
 70. South Ossetia may eventually become a successful UNC secession, given that the 
Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Tuvalu have extended recognition on the 
26 August 2008, 5 September 2008, 10 September 2009, 15 December 2009, and 19 September 
2011 respectively. For discussion of the South Ossetia Conflict in general, see Herrberg, supra 
note 69; see also Gerard Toal, Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War 
Over South Ossetia, 49 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 670 (2009). 
 71. See CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 403; Herrberg, supra note 69, at 13. 
 72. See TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION: WITH SPECIFIC 
REFERENCE TO PRACTICE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 14 (1951); J. L. BRIERLY, 
THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 139 
(Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 22–23 and 26; RAIČ, supra 
note 5, at 89–167; Cassese, supra note 19, at 73–77. 
 73. See Lassa F L Oppenheim, International Law, in 1 THE LAW OF PEACE 125–26 (Hersch 
Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53 
YALE L. J. 385 (1944); Brad R Roth, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INT’L L. 128 (2000).  
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collective recognition by international organisations is a sine qua non 
for statehood.74 The difference between the three recognition theories is 
important in the context of secession, because depending on which one 
is accepted, the process of secession ends and the outcome begins at 
different points. For proponents of the declaratory theory, this critical 
point prima facie occurs when a putative state satisfies the criteria for 
statehood based on effectiveness.75 For proponents of the constitutive 
theory, this point definitively occurs when a putative state satisfies the 
criteria for statehood based on effectiveness and attains the recognition 
of other states. For proponents of the constitutive-collective theory, this 
point definitively occurs when a putative state satisfies the criteria for 
statehood based on effectiveness and attains admission to the UN. 
In order to determine when the process of secession ends and the 
outcome begins, two interrelated questions must be addressed: first, it 
must be ascertained what the generally accepted criteria for statehood 
based on effectiveness common to the declaratory, constitutive and 
constitutive-collective recognition theories are; and second, it must be 
determined, de lege lata, whether the recognition of other states is a sine 
qua non for statehood.  
VI.  WHAT ARE THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED CRITERIA FOR STATEHOOD 
BASED ON EFFECTIVENESS COMMON TO THE DECLARATORY, 
CONSTITUTIVE AND CONSTITUTIVE-COLLECTIVE RECOGNITION 
THEORIES? 
The declaratory, constitutive and constitutive-collective 
recognition theories hold that a putative state must satisfy the four 
criteria enumerated in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of States, which stipulates:  
The state as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations 
with other states. 
Although these four criteria have been generally regarded as 
orthodoxy, an additional fifth criterion—independence—has also been 
widely held as essential to the satisfaction of the criteria for statehood 
 
 74. See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS 
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 79 (1951); JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
73, 79 (1987). 
 75. It prima facie occurs because the declaratory theory entails consideration of the impact 
of peremptory norm (jus cogens) violations which will invalidate a seceding territory’s claim to 
statehood. If there are no peremptory norm violations, then statehood will be achieved. See the 
present article infra. 
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based on effectiveness, and is thus common to proponents of the 
declaratory, constitutive and constitutive-collective recognition 
theories.76  A detailed overview of these five criteria is beyond the 
scope of the present article, but the following skeletal points might 
nonetheless be observed. 
First, Oppenheim has defined a permanent population as “an 
aggregate of individuals of both sexes who live together as a community 
in spite of the fact that they may belong to different races or creeds, or 
be of different colour.”77 A permanent population, however, need not be 
a constant one. In the Western Sahara Case,78 for example, the ICJ 
ruled that nomadic tribes satisfied the criterion.79 On the other hand, 
populations which only move into a territory for the purpose of gaining 
economic benefit, or to conduct scientific research, do not satisfy the 
criterion.80  
Second, a state must possess a defined territory. It is throughout 
this territory that the state exercises sovereignty. A defined territory 
does not, however, require an absence of undisputed frontiers. A 1929 
German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal emphasized this point, 
remarking:  
Whatever may be the importance of the delimitation of 
boundaries, one cannot go so far as to maintain that as long as this 
delimitation has not been legally effected the State in question 
cannot be considered as having any territory whatever. In order to 
say that a State exists it is enough that this territory has a sufficient 
consistency, even though its boundaries have not yet been 
accurately delimited, and that the State actually exercises 
independent public authority over that territory.
81
 
This general rule was later affirmed by the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases82 and Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad).83   
 
 76. The independence criterion is arguably subsumable within art 1(d) of the 1933 
Montevideo Convention. See generally, CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 62; RAIČ, supra note 5, at 
74. 
 77. Oppenheim, supra note 73, at 118.  
 78. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).  
 79. Id. at 342–44; see generally Gino J. Naldi, The Statehood of the Saharan Arab 
Democratic Republic, 25 J. INDIAN INT’L. L. 448, 452–53 (1985); DIXON, supra note 19, at 119.  
 80. Antarctica, for example, which is populated by scientific personnel, is not a state. See 
generally Bengt Broms, States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 44 
(Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991); MALANCZUK, supra note 13, at 76.  
 81. Deutsch Continental Gas Gesellschaft v. Polish State, 5 I.L.R. 11, 14–15 (1929); see 
generally CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 49–50; RAIČ, supra note 5, at 61.  
 82. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den. & Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 32 
(Judgments); see generally, CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 50.  
 83. Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 
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Third, in relation to the effective government criterion, recent 
scholarship by Raič has indicated that a state created by secession 
pursuant to the law of self-determination will not, by virtue of the 
“compensatory force principle,”84 be required to strictly satisfy the 
effective government criterion.85 In the case of consensual secession, 
where there is no clash of sovereignty between the existing state and 
putative secessionist state, the application of this principle is relatively 
uncontroversial: the degree of governmental effectiveness required is 
substantially reduced. In the case of unilateral secession, however, the 
situation is more nuanced. Drawing upon case studies from the colonial 
context (Congo, Algeria, Guinea-Bissau and Angola) as well as the non-
colonial context (Bangladesh, Croatia and Kosovo), the compensatory 
force principle indicates that the government can be somewhat 
ineffective, or of minimal utility, with respect to effective control 
throughout its territory.86 Conversely, as indicated by the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it 
would seem that a territorial entity created by secession not in 
conformity with the law of self-determination (i.e., not established in 
response to deliberate, sustained and systematic government-sponsored 
discrimination) will simply be unable to satisfy the effective 
government criterion.87 Thus, in the state creation context, the effective 
government criterion has been arguably reformulated to equate with the 
right of peoples to external self-determination.88  
Having elaborated this general principle, however, it is apposite to 
note that it is not absolute. The independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), for 
example, cannot be easily explained by the operation of the law of self-
determination and the compensatory force principle.89 At the time of its 
 
6, 44, 52 (Feb. 3)(Judgment); see generally CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 50.  
 84. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 104.  
 85. Id. at 104, 364; BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 71; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 205 (Cambridge, 6th ed., 2008); DUGARD RECOGNITION, supra note 74, at 78–79.  
 86. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 394. 
 87. Id. 
 88. DUGARD RECOGNITION, supra note 74, at 79.  
 89. Other secessions related to the break-up of Yugoslavia which occurred after 1992 – the 
date at which the SFRY is generally accepted to have entered a state of dissolution and thus 
extinction – need not be explained by the law of self-determination and the compensatory force 
principle. The secession of Slovenia could perhaps be described as quasi-consensual. Slovenia 
declared its independence on June 25, 1991 and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), substantially 
under the control of the Serb-dominated federal Secretariat for National Defence, occupied 
strategic points in Slovenia. After a few days of strong resistance by Slovenian militia forces, a 
ceasefire was agreed, known as the Brioni Accord. Soon thereafter the federal presidency ordered 
the JNA to withdraw from Slovenia. In October of 1991 Slovenia again declared its 
independence, and this time the JNA made no response, thereby indicating acquiescence with 
Slovene independence. See Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the 
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independence, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not strictly satisfy the effective 
government criterion, with various parts of the Republic’s territory 
remaining beyond the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government’s control.90 
Furthermore, it was not clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina was established 
pursuant to the law of self-determination, which permits the unilateral 
pursuit of external self-determination by peoples when their internal 
self-determination is consistently and egregiously denied by the existing 
state. As Raič has observed:  
Even if it would be accepted that Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded 
from the SFRY unilaterally, and assuming for the moment that the 
[Bosnian Muslims] formed a  ‘people’ in an ethnic sense and thus a 
collectivity potentially entitled to a right of secession, the question 
must be addressed whether the [Bosnian Muslims] were in practice 
exposed to such harm (in the form of, for instance, a serious 
violation of their right of internal self-determination and/or serious 
and widespread violations of their individual human rights) prior to 
the proclamation of independence in March 1992, that the relevant 
secession has to be considered the ultimum remedium for 
safeguarding their identity, freedom and human rights. On the basis 
of the facts of the relevant period, the answer can only be in the 
negative. For the [Bosnian Muslims] were exposed to serious and 
widespread violations of their human rights only after the 
proclamation of independence.
91
 
Despite the exceptional case of Bosnia-Herzegovina it would 
nonetheless seem, from the case studies mentioned above, that the 
compensatory force principle is generally valid, functioning to reduce 
the stringency of the effective government criterion when the newly 
created state is established pursuant to the law of self-determination. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina should therefore be viewed as an aberration based 
upon political and factual expediency.  
Fourth, a state must have the ability to enter relations with other 
states, which requires that it must politically and legally represent itself 
to other states and within international forums.92 As Crawford has 
noted, however, in terms of its practical implications, the criterion 
 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 569 (1992); STEVE TERRETT, THE 
DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF 
PEACEMAKING IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD  (2000); Macedonia’s secession formally 
occurred once the SFRY was dissolved, thereby ensuring that no existing state remained to 
challenge Macedonian independence. See PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (2002) [hereinafter RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA].  
 90. Weller, supra note 89, at 590. 
 91. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 415–16.  
 92. Note though, that it does not require that a state must represent itself to other states and 
international forums; see id. at 73. 
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represents a conflation of the effective government and independence 
criteria.93   
Fifth, in relation to the independence criterion, it has been argued 
that a state created by secession must demonstrate formal and actual 
independence.94 The former requires that the state created manifest the 
formal hallmarks of independence, while the latter requires the absence 
of political control by other states. 95 
In summation, before the process of secession can be said to have 
concluded, these five criteria based on effectiveness must be fulfilled by 
any putative secessionist state.  
VII.  IS THE RECOGNITION OF OTHER STATES A SINE QUA NON  
FOR STATEHOOD? 
Having enumerated the five criteria for statehood based on 
effectiveness, it remains to be determined whether the recognition of 
other states is a sine qua non for statehood. In other words, must other 
states have extended recognition to a putative secessionist state before it 
can legally claim statehood? The resolution of this question is different 
depending on which of the declaratory, constitutive or constitutive-
collective recognition, theories is accepted as most accurately 
representing lex lata.96  
VIII.  THE DECLARATORY RECOGNITION THEORY 
With regard to treaty law, no support exists for the position that 
recognition is a sine qua non for statehood. The most influential 
international treaty—the UN Charter—is completely silent on the topic. 
Regional treaties, however, indicate support for the declaratory 
approach. Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention and Articles 13 and 
14 of the Charter of the Organization of American States suggest that 
statehood antedates recognition, thereby supporting the declaratory 
recognition theory.  
State practice also indicates that the declaratory theory is generally 
 
 93. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 62. 
 94.  RAIČ, supra note 5, at 75. 
 95. Id. at 78. 
 96. There are of course commentators that hold none of these theoretical approaches are 
appropriate. Worster, for example, has noted that, “[a]lthough many authors state that one or the 
other theory is confirmed by practice, the record does not bear this statement out; neither of these 
two theories [the declaratory and constitutive] satisfactorily describes the state of law on the 
matter.” William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics and the Conception of the State in Recognition 
Theory, 27 B.U. INT'L L. J., 115, 118–19 (2009); contra Crawford, who has suggested that 
“[s]ome continental writers . . . have tended to regard recognition as combining both declaratory 
and constitutive elements. One can sympathize with these views, but at a fundamental level a 
choice has to be made.” CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 27. 
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correct. In December 1974, for example, the General Assembly adopted 
the non-binding Definition of Aggression,97 Article 1 of which provided 
the following definitions: 
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations, as set out in this Definition. 
Explanatory note: In this Definition the term “State”: 
(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to 
whether a State is a member of the United Nations; 
(b) Includes the concept of a “group of States” where appropriate. 
Article 1 thus indicates that states can exist irrespective of whether 
they are recognized by other states or are members of the UN. A priori, 
the Definition of Aggression, which was adopted by consensus, 
confirms the validity of the declaratory recognition theory.  
The declaratory recognition theory is also supported with respect 
to the break-up of the SFRY. On 2 May 1992, European Community 
(EC) member states declared in relation to the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) that “[t]hey are willing to recognize 
that State as a sovereign and independent State, within its existing 
borders, and under a name that can be accepted by all parties 
concerned.”98 Hence, the Republic of Macedonia was considered to 
constitute a state—not an entity, territorial entity or putative state—
prior to receiving the recognition of EC member states. A similar 
situation occurred regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
Montenegro). This state was established in 1992, but recognition was 
only granted in 1996. Nonetheless, numerous diplomatic statements 
recognized that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a state under 
international law from 1992 onwards, despite not having received 
recognition.99 
 With regard to judicial decisions, the preponderance of evidence 
once again indicates support for the declaratory theory. A 1929 
German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, when commenting upon 
 
 97. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 98. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 36 (quoting EPC Informal Meeting of Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs, Declaration on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Guimaraes, 1-2 May 1992, 
EPC Press Release 53/92) (emphasis added). 
 99. See, e.g., Committee of Senior Officials of the Helsinki, SCO Declaration concerning 
the Need for Undertaking Urgent and Immediate Steps With Respect to Yugoslavia, in 
YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS: FROM ITS CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION 22 (May 20, 
1992); Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Resolution 1/6-Ex on the Situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 6th Sess., Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1–2 (Dec. 1992); see generally 
RAIČ, supra note 5, at 36.  
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Poland’s existence stated that “'the recognition of a State is not 
constitutive but merely declaratory. The State exists by itself and the 
recognition is nothing else than a declaration of this existence, 
recognized by the States from which it emanates.'”100 
 Support for the declaratory position is also found within the report 
of the Commission of Jurists relating to the Aaland Islands dispute. The 
report's section dealing with Finland’s independence noted the various 
recognitions Finland had received, but subsequently elaborated that: 
these facts by themselves do not suffice to prove that Finland, from 
this time onwards, became a sovereign State . . . [T]he same legal 
value cannot be attached to recognition of new States in war-time, 
especially to that accorded to belligerent powers, as in normal times 
. . . In addition to these facts which bear upon the external relations 
of Finland, the very abnormal character of her internal situation 
must be brought out. This situation was such that, for a considerable 
time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State 
did not exist.
101
  
It follows that although Finland enjoyed the recognition of 
numerous states, this did not, ipso facto, mandate that Finland possessed 
statehood. Although the Commission clearly regarded the recognitions 
extended as legally relevant, they were not taken as conclusive, with 
considerations of the “conditions required for the formation of a 
sovereign State” also necessary.102 
 More recent support for the declaratory recognition theory can be 
found in the decisions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 
established to advise the European Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. In 
its Opinion No. 1,103 handed down on 29 November, 1991, the 
Commission stated that “the effects of recognition by other states are 
purely declaratory.”104 This position was reiterated by Opinion No. 8,105 
handed down on 4 July 1992, which held that “recognition of a State by 
other States [only has] declarative value . . . .”106 Opinion No. 10,107 
 
 100. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 24 (quoting Deutsch Continental Gas Gesellschaft v. 
Polish State, 5 I.L.R. 11, 13 (1929) (emphasis added) (alterations omitted); see generally RAIČ, 
supra note 4, at 37; 
 101. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 24 (quoting Aaland Islands Question, Report of the 
International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the 
Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, 3 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL 8 (Oct. 1920). 
 102. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 24.   
 103. Arbitration Commission on the Peace Conference in Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1421, 1494–
95 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter Arbitration Commission] 
 104. Id.  (emphasis added); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 24 (emphasis added). 
 105. Badinter Arbitration Commission, supra note 103, at 1522–23. 
 106. Id. (emphasis added); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 399 (emphasis added).  
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also delivered on 4 July 1992, reaffirmed this view, stating that 
“recognition is not a prerequisite for the foundation of a State and is 
purely declaratory in its impact.”108 The Commission thus propounded 
that statehood is constituted prior to any acts of recognition, provided 
that the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness are fulfilled.109 
Support for the declaratory recognition theory is also arguably 
found within the Canadian Supreme Court advisory opinion, Reference 
re Secession of Quebec.110 There, the court noted that although 
recognitions would be politically advantageous for a newly seceded 
Quebec, they would not be a sine qua non for statehood. Indeed the 
court explicitly held that “recognition by other states is not . . . 
necessary to achieve statehood.”111 The Court therefore rejected the 
constitutive recognition theory.112   
Further support for the declaratory view is arguably contained 
within the Bosnian Genocide Case.113 In that case, the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia argued that the ICJ was not competent to adjudicate 
claims on the Genocide Convention, because the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had not recognized each other at 
the time the legal proceedings were commenced.114 The ICJ rejected 
this argument, noting that mutual recognition had subsequently been 
granted in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Dayton Accord),115 and that any chronological defects 
could be overcome by re-filing the claim after this time.116 This suggests 
that Bosnia-Herzegovina's rights were opposable to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia from the time the former became a state in fact, 
notwithstanding the lack of recognition between the two parties.117 
Hence, the ICJ implicitly endorsed the declaratory recognition theory, 
thereby discounting the constitutive view that statehood only 
 
 107. Badinter Arbitration Commission, supra note 103, at 1525–26.  
 108. Id. at 1526; see also RAIČ, supra note 5, at 37.  
 109. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 399. 
 110. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 34. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See RAIČ, supra note 5, at 37 (claiming that “[t]he Canadian Supreme Court rejected the 
constitutive theory in Reference re Secession of Quebec”).   
 113. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11, 
1996).   
 114. Id. at 612–14.  
 115. The Agreement was finalized on December 14, 1995. See also NATO, 15 years ago, 
Dayton Peace Accords: a milestone for NATO and the Balkans (Dec. 14, 2010), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_69290.htm. 
 116. Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia, supra note 113, at 612–13. 
 117. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 25. 
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crystallizes post-recognition.118 
The declaratory recognition theory also enjoys preponderant 
support from eminent scholars. Chen has argued that “whenever a State 
in fact exists, it is at once subject to international law, independently of 
the wills or actions of other States.”119 The same scholar has also 
observed that “[a] State may exist without positive relations with other 
States; but it is not without rights or without means of exercising them . 
. . ."120 Thus, the grant of recognition from existing states or 
international organizations, such as the UN, is not considered a 
constitutive component of statehood. Brierly has similarly contended 
that:  
[t]he better view is that the granting of recognition to a new state is 
not a ‘constitutive’ but a ‘declaratory’ act; it does not bring into 
legal existence a state which did not exist before. A state may exist 
without being recognized, and if it does exist in fact, then, whether 
or not it has been formally recognized by other states, it has a right 
to be treated by them as a state. The primary function of recognition 
is to acknowledge as a fact something which has hitherto been 
uncertain, namely the independence of the body claiming to be a 
state, and to declare the recognizing state’s readiness to accept the 
normal consequences of that fact, namely the usual courtesies of 
international intercourse.
121
 
 Or as Crawford has observed:  
[The declaratory] position has the merit of avoiding the logical and 
practical difficulties involved in the constitutive theory, while still 
accepting a role for recognition as a matter of practice. It has the 
further, essential, merit of consistency with that practice, and it is 
supported by a substantial body of opinion.
122
 
 Other scholars have propounded similar views.123   
 
 118. Id.  
 119. Ti-Chiang Chen, supra note 72, at 14. 
 120. Id. at 38. 
 121. BRIERLY, supra note 72, at 137–39.  
 122. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 22–23.  
 123. BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 88; CASSESE, supra note 19, at 73–75; DIXON, supra note 
19, at 135; MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 60–63 
(6th ed. 1987); John Fischer Williams, Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in 
International Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 776, 778–79 (1934); ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, 
PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); LOUIS L JAFFÉ, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS; IN PARTICULAR OF THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN POWERS 97–98, 372 
(1933); Edwin M Borchard, Recognition and Non-recognition 36 AM. J, INT’L L. 108 (1942); 
Rafael W Erich, La naissance et la reconnaissance des États, 13 RECUEIL DES COURS, 461 
(1926); see also Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53 YALE L. J. 
385, 424 (1944); ALEXANDRE MÉRIGNHAC, 1 TRAITÉ DE DROIT PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 328 
(1905); ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 13–14, 
 
10/16/2013 10:58 AM  
2013] Secession in International Law and Relations 365 
 
IX.  THE CONSTITUTIVE AND CONSTITUTIVE-COLLECTIVE  
RECOGNITION THEORIES 
Unlike the declaratory recognition theory, no treaty provisions 
exist which support the constitutive theory either implicitly or 
explicitly. With regard to the constitutive-collective theory, it has been 
suggested that Article 4 of the UN Charter may imply that admission to 
the UN is tantamount to the conferral of statehood by collective 
means.124 Article 4 of the UN Charter provides that:  
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-
loving States which accept the obligations contained in the present 
Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and 
willing to carry out these obligations. 
2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United 
Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly 
upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
125
 
Articles 4(1) and 4(2) thus restrict membership to states only.126 
The suggestion that Article 4 implies a collective conferral of statehood, 
however, must be rejected, as examination of the Charter’s travaux 
préparatoires indicates that a Norwegian proposal to endow the UN 
with the power to recommend collective recognition of statehood was 
 
147–48 (1986); Karl Doehring, State, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 600, 604 (Rudolf 
Bernhardt ed., 1992); Philip Marshall Brown, The Effects of Recognition, 36 AM. J. OF INT’L. L. 
106 (1942); Josef L. Kunz, Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht’s “Recognition in International 
Law,” 44 AM. J. OF INT’L. L. 713 (1950); KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF 
STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 130–61 (2d ed. 1968); Manfred Lachs, Recognition and 
Modern Methods of International Co-operation, 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 252 (1959); ROSALYN 
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS 135–36 (1963); J. G. STARKE, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91–100 
(1965); 1 DANIEL PATRICK O’ CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 81, 128–34, (Stevens ed., 2d ed. 
1970); JAMES E. S. FAWCETT, THE LAW OF NATIONS 49, 55 (2d ed. 1971); J. S. Davidson, 
Beyond Recognition, 32 N. IR. L. Q. 22 (1981); P. K. MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASIC PRINCIPLES 13 (1994); Donald A Heydt, Non-recognition and the 
Independence of Transkei, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 167, 185 (1978); Colin Warbrick, 
Recognition of States: Recent European Practice, in ASPECTS OF STATEHOOD AND 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE, 24–30 (Malcolm Evans ed., 1997); BURNS 
WESTON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM ORIENTED 
COURSEBOOK 847 (2nd ed. 1980); Jure Vidmar, Conceptualizing Declarations of Independence 
and International Law 32, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 2, 5 (2011). 
 124. See KELSEN, supra note 74, at 79.   
 125. Id.; U.N. Charter arts 2(1) and 2(7); Statute of the International Court of Justice (June 
26, 1945). 
 126. This wording contrasts with Article 1(2) of the League of Nations Covenant, which 
allowed membership by “any fully governing State, Dominion or Colony.” The wording of 
Article 4, therefore, was purposeful, designed to exclude entities that were not states. See 
DUGARD, supra note 74, at 52; Konrad Ginther, Article 4, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 162 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).     
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discarded.127 Furthermore, history reveals that on occasion, territorial 
entities have been admitted to the UN which did not at the time of 
admittance, stricto sensu, qualify as states: the Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic are but two 
examples.128  
Very little evidence in support of the constitutive recognition 
theory can be gleaned from state practice. However, several scholars 
have contended—if only very cautiously—that the practice of EC states 
during the break-up of the SFRY and the Soviet Union may represent an 
affirmation of the constitutive recognition theory. This is because 
recognition in these contexts was predicated not only on the criteria for 
statehood based on effectiveness, as outlined by the Montevideo 
Convention, but also additional grounds, enumerated by the Declaration 
on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States.129 These 
Guidelines provided that recognition should only be granted to states 
that respect the provisions of the UN Charter, guarantee the human 
rights of any ethnic and national minorities, respect the inviolability of 
internationally recognized boundaries, subscribe to nuclear non-
proliferation and meet international standards regarding human rights.130 
By moving beyond the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness, 
scholars such as Hillgruber interpret EC states as having adopted a 
predominantly constitutive approach to recognition, as the acquisition of 
statehood seems to be predicated upon arbitrary Euro-centric criteria 
devoid of legal precedent.131  
 
 127. United Nations Conference on International Organization, Amendments and 
Observations on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal, submitted by the Norwegian Delegation, U.N. 
Doc. 2 G/7, ¶¶ 1, 2 (May 3, 1945). As Aufricht has correctly observed “it was the intention of the 
authors of the Charter not to interpret admission to membership as equivalent to collective 
recognition of States or governments, except for the purposes of membership in the 
Organization,” quoted in Hans Aufricht, Principles and Practice of Recognition by International 
Organizations, 43 AM. J. INT’L. L., 691 (1949); see generally RAIČ, supra note 5, at 42; Van der 
Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 23 (1991). 
 128. KONRAD G. BÜHLER, STATE SUCCESSION AND MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL THEORIES VERSUS POLITICAL PRAGMATISM 172–73 (2001); RAIČ, 
supra note 5, at 43–44.  
 129. European Community: Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, 
International Legal Materials, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1485–87 (1992). 
 130. Id.; see generally, SHEARER, supra note 26, at 125; Roland Rich, Recognition of States: 
The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L 36, 43 (1993); Colin 
Warbrick, Recognition of States, 4 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 473, 477–78 (1992). 
 131. Interestingly, Hillgruber seems to start from the premise that the constitutive theory is 
correct before examining the operation of the EC Guidelines for Recognition of New States. He 
does so on the grounds that non-recognition could not be utilized as a weapon against renegade 
states, if compliance with the Montevideo Convention was the only requirement of statehood. 
This assumes, however, that recognition and statehood are necessarily coterminous. See Christian 
Hillgruber, The Admission of New States to the International Community, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 494 
(1998).  
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The legitimacy of this claim, however, is highly suspect. To begin 
with, the long title of the Guidelines—Declaration on the Guidelines on 
the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union—inherently suggests that they are targeting acts of recognition 
and not the conferral of statehood. This view is also borne out by 
reference to the language employed throughout the Guidelines, which 
arguably suggests that new states may exist prior to recognition. 
Paragraph 4, for example, enunciates that:  
The Community and it Member States confirm their attachment to 
the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, in 
particular the principle of self-determination. They affirm their 
readiness to recognise, subject to the normal standards of 
international practice and the political realities in each case, those 
new states which, following the historic changes in the region, have 
constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the 
appropriate international obligations and have committed 
themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to 
negotiations.
132
 
Had the Guidelines been intended to propound a constitutive 
approach to recognition, paragraph four would more than likely have 
employed the words “entity,” “territorial entity” or “putative state” in 
place of the word “state.” The correct interpretation then is that the 
Guidelines were designed to mould a common recognition policy 
among EC member states, rather than serving to confirm statehood 
itself.133 According to this interpretation, the Guidelines are wholly 
subsumable within the declaratory recognition theory.134  
Finally it should be noted that although the constitutive and 
constitutive-collective recognition theories draw support from scholars, 
this could not be said to be as widespread as scholarly support for the 
declaratory theory.135 
 
 132. Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, supra note 129, at 
1486–87 (emphasis added). 
 133. Brownlie, for example, has correctly noted that “[r]ecognition, as a public act of state, is 
an optional and political act and there is no legal duty in this regard.” BROWNLIE, supra note 26, 
at 89–90. 
 134. Crawford, for example, has written: “But overall the international approach to the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, unhappy as it has been, does not support the constitutive theory, still 
less demand that we adopt it as a general matter.” CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 25. 
 135. In relation to the constitutive theory, see OPPENHEIM, supra note 73, at 125–26; GEORG 
JELLINEK, ALLEGMEINE STAATSLEHRE, 273 (5th ed. 1928); Roth, supra note 73, at 128; GEORG 
SCHWARZENBERGER, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (3d. ed. 1957–76); BERNARD R. BOT, 
NONRECOGNITION AND TREATY RELATIONS 17–19 (A. W. Sijthoff ed., 1968); SATYAVRATA R. 
PATEL, RECOGNITION IN THE LAW OF NATIONS 119–22 (N. M. Tripathi ed., 1959); JAN H. W. 
VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 578–90 (Sijthoff ed., 1968–76); 
Henry J. Richardson III, Excluding Race Strategies from International Legal History: The Self-
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X.  PRE-EMINENCE OF THE DECLARATORY RECOGNITION THEORY  
AND THE MODERN CRITERIA FOR STATEHOOD 
Once the declaratory recognition theory is accepted, however, the 
modern criteria for statehood must be considered, because there are 
numerous examples of effective territorial entities (i.e., entities that 
have satisfied the five criteria enumerated above) that have been denied 
statehood by the international community of states. In other words, 
international forums such as the Security Council and General 
Assembly have, on certain occasions, refused to accord the title of 
“state” to territorial entities that satisfy the five criteria for statehood 
based on effectiveness discussed above.136 Given that the declaratory 
recognition theory is accepted as generally correct, it follows that some 
other factor must be operating to prevent otherwise effective territorial 
entities from attaining the title of “state,” not to mention recognition as 
a state. 
This other factor is a breach of peremptory norms (jus cogens).137 
Where a breach of peremptory norms occurs during a putative state’s 
formative process, statehood will be legally denied.138 Although 
scholars have postulated a variety of peremptory norms, the most 
pertinent in the context of state creation are the interconnected norms of 
self-determination and the prohibition on the illegal use of force.139 Put 
simply, an effective secessionist entity will be denied statehood if it 
breaches these peremptory norms during its formative process.140 
Generally, these norms might be summarized as requiring that a people 
(defined as a nationally-based sub-state group) may not establish a new 
 
executing Treaty Doctrine and the Southern Africa Tripartite Agreement, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 1125–
27 (2000); Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: the 
Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 17 (1968); see Derry J. Devine, 
Rhodesia Since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1 ACTA JURIDICA 63, 90–145 
(1973); Derry J. Devine, Rhodesia and the UN: The Lawfulness of International Concern – A 
Qualification, 2 COMP. & INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 454, 456 (1969); In relation to the constitutive-
collective theory, see KELSEN, supra note 74, at 79; Dugard, supra note 32, at 79. 
 136. Rhodesia’s non-recognition from 1965 to 1980, which arguably breached the 
peremptory norm of the right of peoples to self-determination, is a good example. Dugard, supra 
note 32, at 90; RAIČ, supra note 5, at 130–31; CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 128–31; James E. S 
Fawcett, Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia, 41 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L.112 (1965–1966); 
CHRISTIAN HILLGRUBER, Die Aufnahme Neuer Staaten in die Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft: das 
Völkerrechtliche Institut der Annerkennung von Neustaaten in der Praxis des 19 und 20 
Jahrhunderts 601 (1998). 
 137. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 107; Duursma, supra note 44, at 127–32; RAIČ, supra note 
5, at 156–57. 
 138. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 128; RAIČ, supra note 5, at 156–57. 
 139. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 129–32; Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial 
Secession and the Use of Force: Effect on Claims to Statehood in International Law, 28 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 197 (2013). 
 140. Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and the Use of Force, supra note 139, at 240. 
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state where the group has not previously been systematically denied 
their right to internal self-determination by the existing state. This 
requirement will be satisfied in a colonial context where the territory 
concerned is geographically, ethnically and culturally distinctive from 
the metropolitan power, as enumerated in Resolution 1541141 and 
general state practice.142 In the non-colonial context, guidance as to the 
circumstances where internal self-determination might be denied is 
provided by Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations 
and Article 1 of the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the United Nations.143 The latter provides that the UN 
will, inter alia: 
[c]ontinue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples, 
taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial 
or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and 
recognize the right of peoples to take legitimate action in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their 
inalienable right to self-determination. This shall not be construed 
as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples and thus possessed of a government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any 
kind.
144
  
When subjected to an a contrario reading, the foregoing indicates 
that only those states which represent their population “without 
distinction of any kind” are entitled to guarantees with respect to their 
 
 141. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. 
Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541(XV) (Dec. 15, 1960) [hereinafter Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence]. 
 142. See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 141; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, (Oct. 24, 1970), especially, Principle 5 
paragraphs 2(b) and 6; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 79; Also state practice in 
terms of physical acts and omissions (successful instances of decolonization). 
 143. Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
50/6, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/50/6 (Oct. 24, 1995). For an extended analysis of 
this declaration and its legal effects, see Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession in 
International Law and Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions: Textual Content and Legal 
Effects, 41 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 345 (2013). 
 144. G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 144, at 2 (emphasis added). 
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“territorial integrity or political unity” and that accordingly, secession 
will only be permissible under certain strictly circumscribed 
circumstances.145 However UNC secessionist case studies such as 
Bangladesh, the TRNC, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Kosovo 
collectively indicate that only when human rights violations by the 
existing state are in extremis (ethnic cleansing, mass killings and 
genocide) as opposed to in moderato (political, cultural and racial 
discrimination) will a right to secession be perfected in international 
customary law.146 It is thus under these conditions that force can be 
applied by a non-colonial secessionist group against the existing state 
without breaching the interconnected peremptory norms of self-
determination and the prohibition on the illegal use of force.147  
When the requirements based on effectiveness are satisfied and the 
peremptory norms of self-determination and the prohibition on the 
illegal use of force are not violated, however, a secessionist state can be 
said to legally exist. The outcome of secession can thus be distinguished 
from the process at this point. 
XI.  IS IRREDENTISM SECESSION? 
According to one school of thought, irredentism should be 
included within the definition of secession,148 whilst according to 
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the definition provided by Haverland: Li-Ann Thio, International Law and Secession in the Asia 
and Pacific Regions, in SECESSION: INT’L L. PERSPECTIVES 297 (Marcelo G Kohen ed., 2006); 
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another school, it should not.149 It is therefore necessary to determine 
whether irredentism should be included within the definition of 
secession. 
The etymology of “irredentism” lies in the Italian term 
“irredenta,” meaning “unredeemed.”150 The Oxford English Dictionary 
corresponds with this meaning, defining an “irredentist” as “an adherent 
of the party which advocates the recovery and union to Italy of all 
Italian speaking districts now subject to other countries.”151 In the 
context of international law and relations, irredentism thus refers to the 
amalgamation of an existing state’s territory (state A), in whole or part, 
with another existing state (state B).152 The process of amalgamation can 
be divided into four types: 
Type 1: Exogenous to “state A,” taking the form of forcible 
annexation by “state B,” of all of “state A’s” territory; 
Type 2: Exogenous to “state A,” taking the form of forcible 
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Valentine, The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L. J. 802 (1980); Daryl J. Glaser, The Right to 
Secession: An Antisecessionist Defence, 51 POL. STUD. 369, 371 (2003); Nolte, supra note 26, at 
65; WELHENGAMA, supra note 32, at 212–14; Bishai, supra note 32, at 33; GUIBERNAU 
MONTSERRAT, THE IDENTITY OF NATIONS 54 (2007); Bridget L. Coggins, Secession, 
RECOGNITION AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF STATEHOOD 54 (Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Graduate School of the Ohio State University, 2006); Zhu and Blachford, supra note 
32, at 46; Jaroslav Tir, Keeping the Peace after Secession: Territorial Conflicts Between Rump 
and Secessionist States, 49 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 713, 714–15 (2005); Jaroslav Tir, Dividing 
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RES. 545 (2005).   
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Italy. See Irredentist, ONLINE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY, 
http://www.etymonline.om/index.php?search=irredentist&searchmode=term; Laura Murray, 
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annexation of part of “state A’s” territory; 
Type 3: Endogenous to “state A,” taking the form of complete 
amalgamation between “state A” and “state B”; 
Type 4: Endogenous to part of “state A,” taking the form of a 
secession from “state A,” followed by amalgamation with “state B.”153  
With regard to type 1 and 2 irredentism, “state B” is forcefully 
pursuing the annexation of “state A’s” territory. Thus, during the 
process of annexation, secession, in the form of an endogenously 
motivated withdrawal, does not occur. With regard to type 3 
irredentism, although “state A” consents to and therefore exerts control 
over the amalgamation process, secession in the form of an 
endogenously motivated withdrawal does not occur. With regard to type 
4 irredentism, however, prior to amalgamation occurring, an 
endogenously motivated secession does occur. Bearing these remarks in 
mind, it can now be determined whether irredentism should be included 
within the definition of secession. 
If the words “secession” and “irredentism” are not used 
interchangeably, as indeed they do not appear to be, it follows that there 
must be a point of distinction. Bearing in mind the etymological origins 
of the two words, it is submitted that the point of distinction is that 
secession refers to an endogenously motivated “withdrawal,” whereas 
irredentism essentially connotes an endogenously or exogenously 
motivated “amalgamation.” Secession and irredentism, although related 
phenomena, are thus not identical. It follows that irredentism should not 
be included within the definition of secession.  
Some further points, however, might be made with regard to 
exogenous and endogenous irredentism. First, it is clear that under 
contemporary international law, type 1 and 2 exogenous irredentism 
qualifies as illegal occupation. Under such circumstances, the original 
sovereignty of the forcibly annexed territory is held to subsist, at least in 
legal terms, with the original titleholder.154 In August 1991, for 
example, Iraq invaded Kuwait under the loose banner of historical 
irredentism, citing the fact that Kuwait was once part of the Ottoman 
province of Basra.155 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, however, was 
viewed by the international community as categorically illegal, and 
 
 153. However, it should be noted though, that some definitions narrow irredentist movements 
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collective military action was eventually authorized under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.156 From these 
facts, it can be reasonably inferred that the removal of an illegal foreign 
occupying force from part of a state’s territory does not constitute 
secession, but instead, liberation, or reversion to lawful sovereign 
authority.157 
Second, with regard to type IV endogenous irredentism, it must be 
explained why such a turn of events does not qualify as secession, given 
that for at least a brief point in time, a new state has been created. The 
answer lays in the fact that irredentism, like secession, is both a process 
and an outcome. During the process of type IV endogenous irredentism, 
a new state may be temporarily created, but this is not the end point of 
the process. Type IV endogenous irredentism only occurs as an outcome 
with the subsequent amalgamation of that territory with an already 
existing state. Accordingly, in a conceptual sense, type IV endogenous 
irredentism and secession are not identical concepts, even though 
secession may form one part of the type IV endogenous irredentism 
process.158   
Before concluding, a final issue beckons consideration, namely, 
whether irredentism can be applied to the creation of a new state 
throughout part of the territory of two or more existing states.159 Given 
that the process of state creation in this context is likely to consist of 
two or more simultaneous or near simultaneous endogenously 
motivated withdrawals from existing states, it is submitted that such a 
turn of events is more correctly described as secession rather than 
irredentism.160  
XII.  IS DECOLONIZATION SECESSION? 
According to one school of thought, the withdrawal of colonial 
territories should be included within the definition of secession,161 
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whilst according to another, it should not.162 Before proceeding to 
analyse the validity of these respective positions, however, it is first 
necessary to define the terms “metropolitan power” and “colonial 
territory.”  
The test for determining the difference between a metropolitan 
power and colonial territory is contained within Resolution 1541,163 
adopted by the General Assembly just one day after the 1960 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples.164 Principle IV of Resolution 1541 provides: “Prima facie there 
is an obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory which is 
geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from 
the country administering it.”165 
Principle V of the same Resolution continues: 
Once it has been established that such a prima facie case of 
geographical and ethnical or cultural distinctiveness of a territory 
exists, other elements may then be brought into consideration. 
These additional elements may be, inter alia, of an administrative, 
political juridical, economic or historical nature. If they affect the 
relationship between the metropolitan State and the territory 
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concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the latter in a 
position or status of subordination, they support the presumption 
that there is an obligation to transmit information under Article 73e 
of the Charter.
166
 
Thus, where a territory is “geographically separate and is distinct 
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it” the 
territory concerned is, prima facie, of a colonial nature. The use of the 
word “administering” is significant as it implies an inherently unequal 
relationship between the metropolitan power and the colonial territory. 
Central to this unequal relationship is that the metropolitan power 
enjoys control, by virtue of its sovereign authority, over the colonial 
territory. Principle V explicitly builds upon the import of Principle IV, 
providing that once a prima facie “case of geographical and ethnical or 
cultural distinctiveness of a territory exists, other elements may then be 
brought into consideration.”167 These elements may be of an 
“administrative, political, juridical, economic or historical nature.”168 If 
these elements “affect the relationship between the metropolitan State 
and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the 
latter in a position or status of subordination” it can be safely assumed 
that the territory concerned is of a colonial nature.169   
In order to determine whether decolonization—the independence 
either by consensual or unilateral withdrawal—of a colonial territory 
from a metropolitan power should be included within the definition of 
secession, it is necessary to recall the centrality of sovereignty to the 
secession process as highlighted previously. Bearing this in mind, it 
must be determined whether a metropolitan power possesses 
sovereignty throughout its colonial territories. 
Sureda, when considering this question, has asserted that:  
The idea of trust not being acceptable, the presence of the 
metropolis in its colonies has gradually been considered illegal 
unless confirmed by an act of self-determination. This seems to 
indicate that, within the context of colonialism, self-determination 
has become a peremptory norm of International Law whereby a 
state’s title to a territory having colonial status is void.
170
 
According to this position the combined effect of Chapter XI of 
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the UN Charter, Resolution 1541171 and the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples172 is to displace or 
render “void” the metropolitan power’s sovereignty over its colonial 
territories. 
The view propounded by Sureda, however, is an aberrant one, and 
is not reflected in legal doctrine. In the Rights of Passage Case 
(Portugal v India),173 for example, the ICJ held by a majority of 11-4 
that Portugal, in 1954, had a right of passage with respect to private 
persons, civil officials and goods in general over Indian territory 
surrounding its enclaved territories, Dadra and Nagar-Aveli.174 By so 
ruling, the ICJ effectively accepted that Portugal had sovereignty 
throughout its colonial enclaves. This position was affirmed by the 
Western Sahara Case,175 where the ICJ held that the request before it, 
relating to the status of a non-self-governing territory, did not relate to 
“existing territorial rights or sovereignty over territory.”176 The ICJ thus 
held that Spain’s sovereignty throughout Western Sahara was not in 
question, but rather its transfer to another state (new or already existing) 
sometime in the future.177 Later ICJ cases, such as Land and Maritime 
Boundaries Between Cameroon and Nigeria178 and Case Concerning 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia)179 confirmed this 
position.  
The correct view then is that metropolitan powers possess 
sovereignty throughout their colonial territories, although international 
law imposes qualifications on the continuing exercise of this 
sovereignty. Crawford has summarized the position as follows: 
The view that sovereignty over a non-self-governing territory 
remains with the administering State can be accepted only with 
reservations. That State has accepted far reaching obligations with 
respect to such territories, obligations not substantially different from 
those that were accepted by States administering Trust Territories 
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under Chapter XII. It is true that the Charter contemplates a greater 
measure of international supervision of Trust Territories, but even 
with respect to supervision the two regimes tended to be conflated by 
subsequent Assembly action. Nonetheless, certain distinctions 
remained, at least in theory: for example, the plea of domestic 
jurisdiction was in principle irrelevant to Trust Territories, but was 
capable of applying to Chapter XI territories, however little that plea 
may have prevailed in practice. Administering States have more 
freedom with respect to termination of Non-Self-Governing status 
than with respect to termination of Trusteeship. And the General 
Assembly has never claimed or exercised a power to revoke or 
declare forfeit a State’s title to administer a Non-Self-Governing 
territory: the most it has done is call upon States to terminate such 
status by granting independence.
180
 
Stricto sensu colonial territories should thus be classified as 
constituent parts of the metropolitan power. This conclusion inexorably 
flows from the very nature of colonisation: a metropolitan power 
administers (exercises control over) another subordinate territory. Such 
subordination is the very discrimen of colonisation and can only occur if 
the administered territory is without its own sovereignty. Given this 
fact, it is entirely appropriate to refer to instances of “decolonization”, 
whereby there is the withdrawal of sovereignty from the metropolitan 
power and the creation of a new state, as secession.   
This interpretation is reflected by the domestic legal structures of 
the French, Portuguese and British empires. In 1946, for example, the 
French Fourth Republic was established, which under Article 60 created 
the French Union, connecting French colonial territories to Paris by a 
loose federation. This integration—which was achieved without the 
consultation of the citizens concerned and enshrined the continued 
economic and political subordination of overseas territories to Pairs—
explicitly confirmed France’s underlying sovereignty throughout its 
overseas territories.181 The 1958 French Fifth Republic retained this 
integrationist structure and remains in force today.   
Similarly, the Portuguese colonial empire was integrated into a 
wider multi-continental Portugal in 1951 by amendment to the 1933 
Portuguese Constitution under title 7, entitled On the Portuguese 
Overseas. This integration, which was achieved without the 
consultation of the citizens, concerned and enshrined the continued 
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economic and political subordination of overseas territories to Lisbon, 
and explicitly confirmed Portugal’s underlying sovereignty throughout 
its overseas territories.182  
Although Britain did not adopt the same integrationist approach to 
its colonial empire, it nonetheless emphasized its underlying 
sovereignty throughout its colonial territories, even in situations where 
self-government had been granted by way of devolution.183 When 
considering the case of Madizimbamuto v Lardner-Burke184 in the 
context of Southern Rhodesia, for example, the Privy Council held:  
If the Queen in the Parliament of the United Kingdom was 
Sovereign in Southern Rhodesia in 1965, there can be no doubt that 
the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 and the Order in Council made 
under it were of full effect there. Several of the learned judges have 
held that Sovereignty was divided between the United Kingdom and 
Southern Rhodesia. Their Lordships cannot agree. So far as they are 
aware it has never been doubted that, when a colony is acquired or 
annexed, following conquest or settlement, the Sovereignty of the 
United Kingdom Parliament extends to the colony, and its powers 
over that colony are the same as its powers in the United Kingdom. 
So, in 1923, full Sovereignty over the annexed territory of Southern 
Rhodesia was acquired. That Sovereignty was not diminished by the 
limited grant of self-government which was then made. It was 
necessary to pass the Statute of Westminster, 1931, in order to 
confer independence and Sovereignty on the Six Dominions therein 
mentioned, but Southern Rhodesia was not included.
185
 
The Privy Council later expounded specifically in relation to the 
convention that the British Parliament would not legislate on matters 
within the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Southern 
Rhodesia: 
The learned judges refer to a statement of the United Kingdom 
Government in 1961, already quoted, setting out the convention that 
the Parliament of the United Kingdom does not legislate without the 
 
 182. Again, the validity of the integration is questionable in international law. See generally  
2 ANTONIO HENRIQUE DE OLIVEIRA MARQUES, HISTORY OF PORTUGAL: FROM EMPIRE TO 
CORPORATE STATE 227, 229 (2nd ed., 1976); NEIL BRUCE, PORTUGAL OVERSEAS 57–58 (1975); 
F.C.C. EGERTON, SALAZAR: REBUILDER OF PORTUGAL 262 (1943); Patricia Wohlgemuth, The 
Portuguese Territories and the United Nations, in 545 INT’L CONCILIATION 3 (1963); Inis L. 
Claude, Jr., Domestic Jurisdiction and Colonialism, in NEW STATES AND THE MODERN WORLD 
130–32 (Martin Kilson ed., 1975). 
 183. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 351. 
 184. Madizimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645. See generally H.H. Marshall, The 
Legal Effects of U. D. I. (Based on Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke), 17 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
1022 (1968); CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 351, 369. 
 185. Madizimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, supra note 184, at 722. 
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consent of the Government of Southern Rhodesia on matters within 
the competence of the Legislative Assembly. That was a very 
important convention but it had no legal effect in limiting the legal 
power [plenary legislative competence] of Parliament. 
It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United 
Kingdom Parliament to do certain things, meaning that the moral, 
political and other reasons against doing them are so strong that 
most people would regard it as highly improper if Parliament did 
these things. But that does not mean that it is beyond the power of 
Parliament to do such things. If Parliament chose to do any of them 
the courts could not hold the Act of Parliament invalid.
186
  
The foregoing indicates that Britain maintained sovereignty 
throughout its colonial territories, which despite not being exercised to 
the fullest extent by convention, was nonetheless an ever-present legal 
potentiality. 
It follows that colonial territories were subject to the overarching 
sovereignty of their metropolitan power. Once this premise is accepted, 
it emerges that any withdrawal of this sovereignty to create a new state 
is secession. 
The foregoing discussion has significantly clarified the meaning of 
secession in the context of international law and relations. Some further 
definitional issues, however, require examination if a comprehensive 
legal definition of secession is to be developed—namely, whether a 
formal declaration of independence is necessary for secession, and 
whether secession is synonymous with dissolution, devolution and 
autonomy.   
XIII.  IS A FORMAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE  
NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE SECESSION? 
In order to assess the validity of this requirement, it is necessary to 
assess the function of a formal declaration of independence.187 Crawford 
has suggested that a declaration of independence is “commonly used to 
refer to the unilateral act by which a group declares that it is seceding 
and forming a new state. Although usually declaratory in form, a 
unilateral declaration of independence is not a self-executing act.”188  
Crawford therefore asserts that a formal declaration of 
independence antedates the outcome of secession and is confined to the 
unilateral secession process. It is equally possible, however, that a 
 
 186. Id. at 722–23. 
 187. Heraclides has included a formal declaration of independence within his definition of 
secession. See HERACLIDES, supra note 4, at 1.  
 188. James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession, 
Secession, 69 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 85, 86 (1998). 
10/16/2013 10:58 AM  
380 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 35:343 
 
formal declaration of independence may coincide with the outcome of 
secession and thus statehood, thereby signifying, in the opinion of the 
withdrawing territory, its sovereign and independent status. This may be 
especially the case where the territory has withdrawn via a 
constitutional or politically negotiated secession process, although it 
may still be applicable to the unilateral secession process.   
With regard to the first type of declaration, namely, antedating the 
outcome of secession, it is clear that the announcement is no more than 
a declaration of intent; that is, the withdrawing territory is publicly 
announcing its intention to pursue the process of secession, and 
therefore, could not be viewed as decisive to the outcome itself.  
With regard to the second type of declaration, namely, coinciding 
with the outcome of secession, it must be determined, by reference to 
the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness and compliance with 
peremptory norms, whether a formal declaration of independence is 
legally necessary. Recall that Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Right and Duties of States provides that “[t]he state 
as a person on international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.”189 
Hence, no indication is provided within the criteria for statehood 
based on effectiveness that a formal declaration of independence is 
necessary for the creation of a new state. Regarding the criteria for 
statehood based on compliance with peremptory norms, it is clear that 
the only restrictions imposed upon putative secessionist states are that 
they are not born of peremptory norm violations. Should a declaration 
of independence be issued by a putative secessionist state which has 
breached a peremptory norm during its formative process, as indicated 
by the Kosovo Advisory Opinion,190 such a declaration would be 
unlawful. It emerges then that although a formal declaration of 
independence might be politically useful for secession, it is legally 
unnecessary.  
 
 189. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 
art. 1(d).  
 190. Unilateral Declaration of Independence, supra note 142, ¶ 81; Jure Vidmar, 
Conceptualizing Declarations of Independence and International Law, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 153, 
24 (2012); Besfort Rrecaj, A Contemporary Interpretation of the Principles of Sovereignty, 
Territorial Integrity and Self-Determination, and the Kosovo Conundrum, in KOSOVO: A 
PRECEDENT? THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 130–31 (James 
Summers ed., 2011); Gulara Guliyeva, Kosovo’s Independence: Re-Examining the Principles 
Established by the EC Badinter Commission in Light of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, in KOSOVO: 
A PRECENT? 279  (2011). 
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XIV.  IS DISSOLUTION SECESSION? 
The etymology of “dissolution” lies in the Latin term “dissolutus” 
meaning “to loosen up” or “break apart.”191 The Oxford English 
Dictionary concomitantly defines “dissolution” as “disintegration” and 
the “undoing of . . . bond[s].”192 In the context of international law and 
relations, the term is used to denote the legal extinction, as opposed to 
continuity, of the existing state, after one or more secessions have taken 
place. As such, dissolution describes an outcome that crystallizes after 
one or more secessions have occurred. Crawford, in this connection, has 
observed:  
It is necessary to distinguish unilateral secession of part of a State 
and the outright dissolution of the predecessor State as a whole. In 
the latter case there is, by definition, no predecessor State 
continuing in existence. But the distinction between dissolution of a 
State and unilateral secession of part of a State may be difficult to 
draw in particular cases. The dissolution of a State may be initially 
triggered by the secession or attempted secession of one part of that 
State. If the process goes beyond that and involves a general 
withdrawal of all or most of the territories concerned, and no 
substantial central or federal component remains behind, it may be 
evident that the predecessor State as a whole has ceased to exist.
193
 
Craven, substituting the term “dismemberment” for “dissolution” 
has similarly observed:  
Dismemberment . . . is merely descriptive of a form of extinction 
following the disassociation [secession] of various territorial units. 
As such, it can only really be attributed to a situation ex post facto 
once the lack of continuity of the [existing] State has been finally 
determined.
194
 
Or, as Lalonde has noted: “[t]he principal distinction between 
dissolution and secession lies in the fact that in a case of dissolution 
there is no ‘parent’ state entitled to insist on respect for its territorial 
integrity.”195 
 
 191. Dissolve, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=dissolve&allowed_in_frame=0 (last visited Feb. 18, 
2013); Dissolute ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY,  
http://www.etymonline.com/indexindex.php?term=dissolute&allowed_in_frame=0 (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2013). 
 192. 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 513 (2d ed. 1989).  
 193. Bayefsky, supra note 162, at 42. 
 194. Matthew C. R. Craven, The European Community Arbitration Commission on 
Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. INT’L L. 333, 369 (1995).  
 195. SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTING WORLD: THE 
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Thus, one or more secessions from an existing state may, after this 
process or processes are complete, result either in (1) the creation of a 
new state or states; or (2) the creation of a new state or states, and, if the 
existing state is rendered extinct, also constitute a situation of 
dissolution. Hence, although secession and dissolution are related 
phenomena, they are not, strictly speaking, synonymous.196 
Most secessions do not result in the existing state’s dissolution, as 
international law preferences the continuity of states even if they are 
drastically diminished in terms of territory, population and resources.197 
A good illustration of this preference occurred in 1991 when, following 
the secession of ten member republics, the continuity of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)—with the new name “Russian 
Federation”—was upheld by the UN and without protest from other 
states.198 As Shaw has observed:  
[D]espite the approach taken in December 1991 CIS documentation 
proclaiming the end of the USSR in terms which in law would 
suggest dissolution or dismemberment of that entity thus logically 
precluding continuity, it is clear from all the circumstances that this 
was an essentially political statement not taken by either the parties 
themselves or by third States as constituting a proclamation of 
dissolution preventing claims by Russia of continuity. On the 
 
and dissolution, see Rodoljub Etinski, Has the SFR of Yugoslavia Ceased to Exist as a Subject of 
International Law, in INT’L L. AND THE CHANGED YUGOSLAVA 289 (Radovan Petkovic ed., 
1995), especially the remarks by Sir Francis Vallet at 29.  
 196. Crawford has observed that, “[it] is true that the distinction between dismemberment and 
a series of secessions may be in the eyes of the beholder . . . .” CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 714.   
 197. CRAWFORD, supra 4, at 93, 189; Milenko Kreća, Succession and the Continuity of 
Yugoslavia, 33 JUGOSLOVENSKA REVIJA ZA MEDUNARODNO PRAVO 181 (1992).  
 198. On 24 December, for example, the Russian Permanent Member to the UN directed a 
letter to the UN Secretary General from the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, 
stating, inter alia, “the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United 
Nations, including the Security Council and all other organs and organizations of the United 
Nations system is being continued by the Russian Federation (RSFSR) with the support of the 
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In this connection, I request that the name 
“Russian Federation” should be used in the United Nations in place of the name [USSR]. The 
Russian Federation maintains full responsibility for all the rights and obligations of the USSR 
under the Charter of the United Nations, including financial obligations.” quoted in CRAWFORD, 
supra note 4, at 677. A former Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation has written that 
“Russia, as the continuing State of the USSR, intends to promote in every possible way the 
strengthening of the United Nations.” Andrei Kozyrev, Russia: A Chance for Survival, 71 
FOREIGN AFF. 11 (1992); see generally, Yehuda Z. Blum, Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union’s 
Seat at the United Nations 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 361 (1992); David O. Lloyd, Succession, Secession, 
and State Membership in the United Nations, 26 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 777 (1994); 
Müllerson, supra note 58, at 477; In another context, Müllerson, after extensive analysis, has 
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SUCCESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE, 11 (Brigitte Stern ed., 1998). 
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contrary, Russia’s continuity was asserted and supported by all 
parties.
199
 
Accordingly, only in the very rare circumstances where one or 
more secessions result in no semblance of the existing state will 
dissolution also have occurred.   
One example of the foregoing is the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). From 1992 onwards, despite the 
Belgrade government adducing evidence that the SFRY continued to 
exist, the international community increasingly held that the SFRY was 
extinct. In November 1991, for example, Opinion No. 1 of the 
Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia200 
indicated that the SFRY was in a process of dissolution.201 In May 1992, 
the Security Council in Resolution 757 confirmed this interpretation, 
noting that “the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations 
has not been generally accepted.”202 In July 1992, Opinion No. 8 of the 
Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia,203 
noting a European Council Declaration and Resolution 757, asserted 
that “the SFRY no longer exists.”204  In September of the same year, the 
Security Council in Resolution 777 echoed this view, asserting that “the 
state formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
has ceased to exist.”205 The same Resolution noted that “the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue 
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia in the United Nations.”206 This position was maintained 
by later Security Council resolutions such as, inter alia, Resolution 
 
 199. Malcolm N. Shaw, State Succession Revisited, 5 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 34, 49–50 
(1994).  
 200. Maurizio Ragazzi, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on 
Questions Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1494–96 (1992).  
 201. It should be noted, however, that to speak of dissolution as a process is problematic. 
Craven, for example, has correctly observed that “[i]f the issue is simply whether or not a State 
continues to exist, it makes no sense to speak of dismemberment as a process.” Craven, The 
European Community Arbitration, supra note 194, at 369; see generally regarding Opinion No. 1, 
CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 710; RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 89, at 
204–05.  
 202. S.C. Res. 757, Mandatory Sanctions Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro), U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (May 30, 1992).  
 203. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, supra note 200, at 1521–23.    
 204. Id. at 1521; see generally CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 710; RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF 
YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 89, at 205–07.  
 205. S.C. Res. 777, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (Sept. 16, 1992).  
 206. Id.  
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1022.207 The General Assembly took a less decisive view, but 
nonetheless maintained that:  
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
cannot continue automatically the membership of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and 
therefore decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United 
Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General 
Assembly.
208
 
The question might be asked, therefore, why the USSR was held to 
continue as a state, but the SFRY was not? Aside from political 
concerns,209 there was one principal legal reason, namely, that the 
SFRY—unlike the USSR—did not form the majority of territory and 
population of the original state. This fact, more than any other, militated 
against the claim that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) essentially represented the continuation of the SFRY.210 A 
priori, it also militated against the claim that the SFRY had experienced 
multiple secessions without also experiencing dissolution. 
One possible exception to this statement of general principle, 
however, was the secession and dissolution of the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic (CSFR), which was achieved by voluntary agreement 
on 31 December 1992 and replaced by two new states: the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. As Crawford has suggested, the fact that the 
majority of territory, population and economic resources of the former 
CSFR were concentrated in the Czech Republic might have indicated 
that this was not a case of secession and dissolution, but instead only 
secession.211  
In conclusion it can be said that secession and dissolution, 
although related phenomena, are not synonymous. Dissolution only 
occurs after one or more secessions have taken place and the existing 
state is rendered extinct. 
 
 207. S.C. Res. 1022, Immediate Suspension of Sanctions on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro), U.N. SCOR, 3595th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1022 (Nov. 22, 1995).  
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A/RES/, ¶ 1 (Sept. 22, 1992).   
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note 194, at 354–55. 
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10/16/2013 10:58 AM  
2013] Secession in International Law and Relations 385 
 
XV.  IS DEVOLUTION SECESSION? 
The etymology of “devolution” lies in the Latin term “devolvere” 
meaning “to roll down.”212 This is mirrored in the Oxford English 
Dictionary which defines “devolution” as “[t]he passing of . . . power 
[and] authority” and “[t]he causing of authority, duties, or the like to fall 
upon a substitute or substitutes.”213 In the context of international law 
and relations, the term is commonly used to describe a central 
government’s voluntary grant of certain legislative powers to regional 
or local government.214 The granting of legislative power is temporary 
and can at any time be unilaterally withdrawn by the central 
government, which still retains plenary legislative competence and 
hence, sovereignty.215  Unlike secession, a new state is not created. It 
follows that devolution should not be included within the definition of 
secession.   
Noteworthy is that the meaning of “devolution” adopted above 
conflicts with Crawford’s definition of the same concept, namely: “the 
grant[ing] of independence by the previous sovereign.”216 The use of the 
words “grant”, “independence” and “previous sovereign” indicate that 
for Crawford, devolution connotes the creation of a new state over part 
of the territory of an existing state with the latter’s consent.217 As 
hitherto indicated such a turn of events is more correctly characterized 
as constitutional or politically negotiated secession.   
XVI.  IS AUTONOMY SECESSION? 
The etymology of “autonomy” lies in the Greek term “autonomos” 
which means “to live by one’s own laws.”218 The Oxford English 
Dictionary correspondingly defines “autonomy” as the “right of self-
government, of making one’s own laws.”219 Scholarly definitions of 
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autonomy concur.  
Lapidoth, for example, has suggested: “A territorial political 
autonomy is an arrangement aimed at granting a group that differs from 
the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the 
majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its 
distinct identity.”220  Crawford has similarly written: “[A]utonomous 
areas are regions of a State, usually possessing some ethnic or cultural 
distinctiveness, which have been granted separate powers of internal 
administration, to whatever degree, without being detached from the 
State of which they are part.”221 Or as has been observed by Hannum 
and Lillich: “Generally autonomy is understood to refer to 
independence of action on the internal or domestic level, as foreign 
affairs and defense normally are in the hands of the central or national 
government . . . .”222  
It emerges from the foregoing that autonomous regions operate in 
a manner akin to states. Unlike states, however, autonomous regions do 
not enjoy sovereignty and hence standing in international law. This is 
because they exist within states and their quasi-independent status can 
often be revoked or modified by the central government, which still 
retains plenary legislative competence.223 As autonomy does not result 
in a grant of statehood, it is submitted that it should not be included 
within the definition of secession.224  
XVII.  A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL DEFINITION OF SECESSION 
To recapitulate, in the context of international law and relations, 
“secession” refers to: The withdrawal of territory (colonial or non-
colonial) from part of an existing state to create a new state. 
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To this prima facie definition, however, we may add the following 
supplementary points: 
First, secession is a process which leads to an outcome. The 
outcome of secession is not defined in relation to the specific process by 
which it is achieved.  
Second, secession may occur according to two general processes: 
consensual and unilateral. The former can be divided into constitutional 
and politically negotiated secession. 
Third, generally speaking, the process of secession ends and the 
outcome occurs when the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness 
are satisfied and no breaches of peremptory norms of international law 
(jus cogens) can be identified during the putative secessionist state’s 
formative process. 
Fourth, recognition does not determine when the process of 
secession ends and the outcome occurs because the declaratory 
recognition theory, which provides that statehood antedates recognition, 
is generally recognized as most closely representing lex lata vis-à-vis 
international law. Accordingly, it is theoretically conceivable that the 
outcome of secession may occur in the total absence of third state 
recognition (however politically and practically important recognition in 
such a context may be). 
Fifth, the previous point is correct unless the total absence of third 
state recognition is based upon breaches of peremptory norms of 
international law (jus cogens) during the putative secessionist state’s 
formative process. In such a case, the process of secession will be 
ongoing, and the outcome will not have occurred. Generally, the 
outcome will be unobtainable and the putative secessionist state will 
languish as a stateless entity with the prospect of reabsorption by the 
existing state.  
Sixth, when secession occurs there is no need for a formal 
declaration of independence from the (putative) secessionist state. This 
rule is equally applicable in the context of a formal declaration of 
independence antedating or coinciding with the outcome of secession. 
Seventh, and finally, secession is distinguishable from:  
i) Annexation, defined as the forcible incorporation, in whole 
or part, of an existing state’s territory by another existing 
state.   
ii) Cession, defined as an existing state’s transfer of part of its 
territory to another existing state, without regard for the 
desires of the population within the transferring territory.   
iii) Irredentism, defined as the amalgamation of an existing 
state’s territory, in whole or part, with another existing 
state.   
iv) Dissolution, defined as the outcome of one or more 
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secessions from an existing state, facilitating the latter’s 
extinction.   
v) Devolution, defined as the voluntary grant of certain 
legislative powers to a lower level of government and 
without a transfer of sovereignty.  
vi) Autonomy, defined as the power of a sub-state region to 
regulate its own affairs by enacting legal rules but without 
a transfer of sovereignty. 
Arriving at a justified definition of secession is critical in the 
context of international law and relations as secession is a well-
recognised method of state creation. Rather than assuming (erroneously) 
that there is a commonly accepted definition of secession, or 
propounding an arbitrary definition devoid of justification, it is 
incumbent upon scholars to invoke a more exacting approach. Indeed, 
when we speak of secession as scholars, it is important to pause and 
ask: “what are we talking about?”   
 
 
 
